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Introduction. In investment funds, two agents cooperate in creating value: the investment manager and 
the investor (client). The manager receives an amount of money for investment and manages the fund; he 
selects assets and allocates resources across assets. The client may periodically inject further capital in the 
fund or withdraw some amount of money from it. The decisions on timing and size of interim cash flows 
affect the overall performance of the investment, which is then the result of an interaction between 
manager’s and investor’s decisions. The literature on performance measurement is unanimous in regarding 
the IRR as the correct rate of return for the overall investment, while the Time-Weighted Rate of Return 
(TWRR) is regarded as the correct rate for capturing the “manager’s rate of return”, unaffected by the 
client’s decisions (e.g. Gray and Drewer, 1971; Feibel, 2003; Spaulding, 2005; Kellison, 2009). We use the 
Average Internal Rate of Return (AIRR) approach, first introduced in Magni (2010), to introduce a pair of 
metrics, opposed to IRR and TWRR, which measure the manager’s performance and the investor’s 
performance on the basis of the market values of the fund. We also underscore relations between  
manager’s AIRR and the TWRR.  
The fund’s return. Suppose an investor (client) invests a monetary amount in a fund which is managed by 
an investment manager. Let  denotes the investor’s cash flow at time . The project is characterized by 
the cash-flow stream  = (, 	, … , ); at time  the investment is liquidated. Obviously,   < 0 and 
 > 0. For each date  = 1,2, … , , let 	 denote the value of the fund at the beginning of period 
[ − 1, ] and let  represent the value of the fund at the end of the same period:  =  − . The return 
in a generic period is  =  − 	 =  +  − 	, so the rate of return   in period [ − 1, ]  is 
 = /	. Therefore, 	 = 	 +  −  = 	(1 + ) − 	 with the boundary conditions  = − 
and  = 0. The latter implies  =  , whence  = (−, 	, … , 	, ). For assessing profitability, it is 
necessary to compare the investment fund’s performance with an alternative fund’s performance: a 
benchmark fund or index is selected, whose rate of return represents the minimum required rate of return. 
To this end, let 	be the rate of return of the benchmark in period [ − 1, ],  = 1,2, … , , and suppose the 
investor replicates his policy of deposits and withdrawals by using the benchmark rather than the fund: this 
means that the investor contributes to (withdraws from) the benchmark fund the cash flow  at time 
 = 0,1,… ,  − 1. This replicating strategy implies a cash-flow stream equal to  with the exception of the 
terminal value, which is ∗ = −∑ 	" #	, where # ≔ ∏ (1 + &)&"'	 . The value added (VA) is 
obtained as the difference of the terminal values: () =  − ∗ =  − ∗ = ∑ " #.  Wealth 
creation or destruction for the investor is supplied by the sign of (). The rate  is a hurdle rate which 
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represents an opportunity cost of capital in period [ − 1, ]. If  >   value is created in period [ − 1, ], 
if  <  value is destroyed. The excess return generated by the fund investment in each period is 
 − 	 = 	( − )	 , whence () = ∑ 	( − )"	 # 	which may be rewritten as () =
*	( − ), where  * = ∑ 	"	 # ,  = ∑ +"	 ,  = ∑ +,"	 		+ = 	#/*.	 The rate  is the 
mean of the fund’s return rates, with weights given by the (discounted) market value of the fund 
investment. The rates  and  are particular cases of the “Average Internal Rate of Return” (AIRR) model, 
first introduced in Magni (2010). The client invests an overall capital * at an overall rate of return equal to  
(the project’s AIRR), and, so doing, he foregoes an overall rate of return equal to . A computational 
shortcut (particularly useful if the required rate of return is constant) is available, which splits up the 
project’s rate of return into the benchmark’s overall return rate and an excess return rate:  =  + ,, where 
, = ()/*. It is worth stressing that the fund investment’s AIRR is the overall rate of return on the true 
fund’s values. By contrast, the internal rate of return (IRR) internally devises its own interim capital values, 
which are disconnected from the true values of the fund:  ℎ = ℎ	(1 + .//) − ,			ℎ = −. If the fund 
values grew at a constant rate, then ℎ would be the correct capital investment at the beginning of period 
[ − 1, ] and the IRR would be the correct rate of return. But the fund’s value is  ≠ ℎ, therefore .// is 
not the rate of return on the capital actually invested and the IRR-implied return is different from the true 
return:   =  − 	 = 	 ≠ .// ∙ ℎ	 (see also Altshuler and Magni, 2011).  
The manager’s return. In order to measure the manager’s performance, it is necessary to suppress the 
effect of timing and magnitude of cash flows deposited and withdrawn by the client. To this end, assume 
the client invests  = − and employs a buy-and-hold strategy so that the investment is characterized by 
the cash-flow stream 2 = (, 0,0, … ,0, ̂) where ̂ = −∏ (1 + )"	  is the liquidation value, which is 
entirely attributable to the manager’s decisions about asset selection and allocation (given the client’s 
initial contribution). Project 2  is then interpretable as the “manager’s project”. Denote with 2	 the 
beginning-of-period value of the fund in period [ − 1, ],  = 1,2,… , , with 	2 = −. It is evident that 
2 = 2	(1 + ) represents the market value of the manager’s project, which grows at the rate  in each 
period. Given that the market value of the fund, , depends on both manager’s decisions and client’s 
decisions, the capital 2 represents that part of  which is generated by the manager’s decisions. To 
compute the value added by the manager one needs consider what the financial result would be if the 
client invested  in the benchmark rather than in the fund managed by the fund manager, keeping the 
assumption of buy-and-hold strategy. Denoting with ̂∗   such a value, one gets ̂∗ = #. The value added 
by the manager is then given by the difference ̂ − ̂∗. The latter, denoted by  ()4 , is not affected by the 
client’s choices about interim deposits and withdrawals. Hence, ()4 = ̂ − ̂∗ = ̂ + # =
[∏ (1 + )"	 −∏ (1 + )"	 ]. It is now easy to calculate the AIRR of the manager’s project, which we 
call the “manager’s rate of return”, with the same reasoning employed for the fund: we get ()4 = *2(5̂ − ̂), 
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where *2 = ∑ 2	"	 #,			5̂ = ∑ +6"	 , ̂ = ∑ +6"	 , +6 = 2	#/*2 . A shortcut for the 
manager’s AIRR is available as well:  5̂ = ̂ + ,7, where ,7 = ()4/*2   is an excess return rate. The literature on 
performance measurement makes use of the time-weighted rate of return (TWRR) to assess the  manager’s 
performance: it is defined as  89// = :(	/) ∙ (;/	) ∙ … ∙ (/	)
< − 1; but this means 89// =
[∏ (1 + )"	 ]	/ − 1, so the TWRR is project 7 internal rate of return and, as such, it internally devises its 
own capitals ℎ2 = ℎ2	(1 + 89//) = −(1 + 89//)  as opposed to the correct value 2 =
2	(1 + ) = ∏ (1 + )"	 . 
The client’s return. Analogously, one can measure the timing and size effect of the client’s decisions. The 
value added by the value added by the client is ()= = () − ()4 = ( − ∗) − (̂ − ̂∗)  which is the 
accumulated value of the cash flows of the “client’s project” > =  − 2 = (0, 	, ;, … , 	,  − ̂). The 
capital invested in > at the beginning of period [ − 1, ], denoted by ?, the residual part of  which is not 
attributable to the manager:	? =  − 2,  = 1,2, , … , , so that  *? = * − *2 = ∑ ?	#"	 . Hence, 
()@ = *?(5̆ − ̆), where 5̆ = ∑ +B"	 					 ̆ = ∑ +B"	 , and +6 = ?	#/*? . The excess return is in this 
case ,C = ()@/*? .  
Decomposition of value added and rates. The value added as a whole is the sum of the value added by the 
manager and the value added by the client: () = *?(5̆ − ̆) + *2(5̂ − ̂) and the fund’s rate of return is a 
weighted average of the manager’s rate of return and the investor’s rate of return:  = DE ∙ 5̆ + DF ∙ 5,̂			DE: =
*?/*,				DF:= *2/*. Analogously, the fund’s hurdle rate is a weighted average of the manager’s hurdle rate 
and the investor’s hurdle rate:  = DE ∙ ̆ + DF ∙ ̂. Each of the three AIRRs (project’s, manager’s, investor’s) 
may be in turn splitted up into a hurdle rate and an excess return rate and the fund’s excess return rate , is 
a weighted average of the manager’s and investor’s excess return rates: , = DE,C + DF,7. It may well occur 
that ̂ < 5̂ 	< , which means that the manager has added value even if it occurs  < . It would be 
incorrect to contrast the manager’s rate of return 5 ̂with , for the latter is a function of the ’s which are 
determined by the interaction of manager’s decisions and client’s decisions. Analogously, the choices of the 
investor may determine, ceteris paribus, an increase in value added if 5̆ > ̆. A twofold decomposition, by 
periods and by agent, is possible. Let  ()(, ℎ) the value added in the -th period by the ℎ-th agent, 
 = 1,… , , ℎ = 1,2 where 1 is the manager (hat) and 2 is the investor (reverse hat), respectively. We get 
()(, ℎ) = 	H (H − H)  and () = ∑ ∑ ()(, ℎ)"	;H"	 . The average excess return is ( − )  where 
 ≔ ∑ 	#"	 /∑ #"	  is the average capital invested, so that () = ∑ ( − )#"	 . 
Analogously, the average excess return supplied by either agent is H(H − H) and we can write 
() = ∑ ∑ H(H − H)	#"	;H"	 . 
AIRR and TWRR. Ranking performance of different managers is possible by scaling the initial investments in 
order to neutralize the client’s decisions on the investment scale. With no loss of generality and for the 
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mere sake of notational convenience, we assume that the benchmark’s rate of return is constant over time. 
Let  I = (1/) ∙ 2 = (−1,0,… ,0, ̂/)  be the normalized manager’s project. Project I ’s value added is 
()J = ()4/ = ̂/ − (1 + )/. Now, consider the function ,K(L) = ()J/L. It is project I ’s excess rate 
of return, relative to an imputed capital of L. Note that, by definition, ()J = L,K(L) for all L ≠ 0. In 
particular, ()J = ,K(1).  Now, the rate of return 5̃(1) =  + ()J  is the AIRR of project I  referred to an 
aggregate capital of 1 euro. Manager’s capabilities are summarized in 5(̃1), which offsets the investment 
scale. The ranking based on ()J  or on 5(̃1) is the same: the former is an absolute measure (value added by 
one euro of capital invested), the latter is a relative measure (a rate of return).  The TWRR provides the 
same ranking as well, because  5(̃1) −  = (1 + 89//) − (1 + ), so TWRR-based ranking is equivalent 
to AIRR-based ranking. It is worth stressing that 5̃(1) is indeed a mean of the manager’s holding period 
rates: 5̃(1) = ∑ +N"	  where +N = O	#/∑ O	#"	 , O = O	(1 + ) − K , O = 1 . 
Alternatively, the same result may be achieved without normalizing the manager’s project: one just 
computes manager’s excess return corresponding to an aggregate capital equal to the initial investment . 
To this end, consider the manager’s excess return ,7 as a function of the aggregate capital: ,7 = ,7(L) =
()4/L. It may be shown that  ,7() = ,K(1) so that the corresponding AIRRs are equal: 5̃(1) = 5(̂).  We 
stress that  5P̂*2Q is the rate of return on the aggregate capital invested in 2  under an assumption of buy-
and-hold strategy, whereas 5P̂2Q captures the return on each euro of capital initially invested under the 
same assumption. While 5P̂*2Q may be used for computation of incentive-based fees (for they are linked to 
the value added), 5P̂2Q may be used for ranking performance. The passage from  ,7P*2Q to ,7P2Q enables 
one to offset the client’s decisions on cash flows. It comes as no surprise that ,7P2Q = ,7P*2Q ∙ P*2/Q; that 
is, ,7P2Q scales down the aggregate investment, so producing the same results as  ,K(1).  Finally, the scaled-
down  5(̂) is a weighted average of the benchmark rate of return and the manager’s AIRR: 5(̂) = R ∙ 5̂ +
(1 − R) where R:= *2/. 
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